Wednesday, September 12, 2007

Another of Fred's scams!


Larger transfers made after freeze/rate drop are indicated in (-) after the names and amounts
*********************************************************************

Frederick Damron - $443,484.00 (Kentucky) http://download.yousendit.com/B4EF45F669C9F4BB


UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

In re: CEP HOLDINGS, INC.,
Debtor.
______________________________________

CEP HOLDINGS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

FREDERICK DAMRON,
Defendant.


Case No. 07-71810
Chapter 11
Judge Massey
Jointly Administered
Adversary Proceeding
No. 07-____________

COMPLAINT TO AVOID AND RECOVER TRANSFERS

COME NOW, CEP Holdings, Inc. (“Holdings”) and Colon End Parenthesis Trust, LLC (“Trust,” and together with Holdings, the “Debtors”), and file this Complaint to Avoid and Recover Transfers, alleging as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. The Debtors filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.) on July 27, 2007 (the “Petition Date”). An order was entered on August 3, 2007 to have their cases jointly administered. This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(F), (H) and (O).

2. Venue of this adversary proceeding is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409.

THE PARTIES

3. On July 9, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) filed its Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Raleigh Division (the “District Court”), commencing the lawsuit styled Securities and Exchange Commission v. CEP Holdings, Inc., d/b/a colonendparenthesis.net, Trevor Reed, Clayton Kimbrell and Colon End Parenthesis Trust, LLC, Case No. 5:07-cv-00256-BO (the “SEC Action”). On July 10, 2007, the District Court entered the Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, Freezing Assets, Appointing a Receiver and Ordering Other Ancillary Relief (the “District Court Order”), to which Order the Defendants consented and the Debtors’ businesses were shut down. William F. Perkins was appointed receiver for the Debtors pursuant to the District Court Order and has since managed the Debtors’ assets and financial affairs.

4. The SEC has alleged that Trevor Reed (“Reed”) and Clayton Kimbrell (“Kimbrell”), through Holdings, were involved in a fraudulent and unregistered offering of securities sold via the internet.

5. Upon information and belief, since May 2006, over $16,000,000 has flowed into the bank accounts of Trust from more than 10,000 participants in one of the three “investment” programs operated by Holding’s d/b/a websites. Trust served as an internet payment processor
through which the Debtors’ participants received and disbursed money.

6. Upon information and belief, Holding’s “investment” programs included the following:

(a) a passive, interest-only investment format at colonendparenthesis.net. This program required a minimum initial investment of $20 and promised a daily return of 2% (more than 600% per annum) that was payable every thirty days by credit to the participant’s account at Trust. The participant committed to either a 180-day or 360-day option, but the original principal was not returned to the participant.

(b) investment autosurf websites generally known as CEPCoast.com and Coastin88.com. These programs were functionally identical, but had different financial restrictions and payout amounts. Participants purchased advertising packages, or “Ad Packs” at $5.00 each, which allowed the participant to place his website into a pool of websites that would be viewed and rated on a scale of one to five. If a participant purchased an Ad Pack, he or she then chose to either participate in the program offered at CEPCoast.com or Coastin88.com and was, thereafter, eligible to recover some of his or her costs, or even make a profit, by viewing and rating 15 websites--no more, no less--each day. For CEPCoast.com, 90% of each day’s revenue from purchases of Ad Packs was split pro-ratably among the participants who viewed websites that day, which participants could receive back as much as 130% of the cost of their Ad Packs. For Coastin88.com, 88% of each day’s revenue from purchases of Ad Packs was split pro-ratably among the participants who viewed websites that day, which participants could receive back as much as 115% of the cost of their Ad Packs. The caveats of these auto-surf programs were: (i) only participants who purchased Ad Packs were eligible to view and rate websites in order to earn credits, (ii) to share in a daily payout, the participant had to review all 15 websites sent to him or her that day, (iii) CEPCoast.com paid out 90% and Coastin88.com paid out 88% of daily Ad Pack purchases in their respective programs, and (iv) the payout to viewers each day was dependent on the amount of Ad Packs sales on that day (cash inflow), not on the number of websites viewed and rated by participants.

7. Upon information and belief, investors were led to believe that their funds were used to invest in safe “brick and mortar” type businesses that produced the promised yields, but there was, in fact, no significant investment of participant funds in any third-party business or investment other than a money market account yielding approximately 4%. Neither Reed nor Kimbrell invested personal funds in the programs described above.

8. Upon information and belief, (a) there was no review or audit of the financial transactions of the Debtors and (b) their records consist almost entirely of databases created by website transactions.

9. Several millions of dollars were transferred out of the Debtors’ accounts to Reed, Kimbrell, their family, as well as to employees and sub-contractors, for which it is believed that the Debtors did not receive reasonably equivalent value.

10. The Debtors had no source of funding for the profits paid to participants in these schemes other than the deposits of subsequent investors. It appears that more than 4,000 investors are still owed more than $9,000,000 of the money they initially invested in the Debtors.

11. Defendant Frederick Damron is a resident of Kentucky.

12. Defendant may be served with process in this adversary proceeding by mailing a copy of the summons and a copy of this Complaint by first class United States mail, postage prepaid, to his attention at 130 South Cold Springs Road, Olive Hill, Kentucky 41164, or by such other means as may be permitted by Rule 7004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.

THE AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS

13. Defendant participated in one or more programs offered by the Debtors as described in paragraph 6 above.

14. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an itemization of the transfers from the Debtors to Defendant by date and amount of each transfer, which transfers totaled $443,484.00 (the “Transfers”).

15. During the operation of the Debtors’ scheme as set out in paragraphs 4 through 10 (the “Scheme”), various investors, including Defendant, were paid funds by the Debtors that purported to be (a) redemptions of funds invested or (b) profits made on principal funds invested.

The source of these payments, including those to Defendant, was the principal investments of other investors. The payments to investors were made by the Debtors generally in furtherance of the Scheme. The fraudulent nature of the transfers, including those to the Defendant, was concealed. It is not fair for those investors who received such payments, including Defendant, to keep those payments to the detriment of the remaining creditors and investors who have not been paid and whose investments were used to pay other investors, including Defendant.

16. The Debtors contend that all transfers, in whatever form, made to Defendant by the Debtors are avoidable and recoverable by the Debtors. Defendant is on notice that the Debtors are seeking avoidance and recovery of all transfers from the Debtors to them, even if such transfers are not listed on the attached exhibit, and even if the total amount of these transfers exceeds the amounts set forth on the attached exhibit.

COUNT I
AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY OF THE TRANSFERS PURSUANT
TO §§ 548(a)(1)(A) AND 550(a)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

17. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 16 above as if fully set forth in Count I herein.

18. The Transfers were transfers of interests in property of the Debtors.

19. The Transfers were made in furtherance of the Scheme.

20. The Transfers were made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of the Debtors to which the Debtors were or became indebted on or after the dates that the Transfers were made.

21. The Transfers are avoidable pursuant to § 548(a)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and are recoverable by the Debtors from Defendant pursuant to § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

COUNT II
AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY OF THE TRANSFERS PURSUANT
TO §§ 548(a)(1)(B) AND 550(a)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

22. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 above as if fully set
forth in Count II herein.

23. The Transfers were transfers of interests in property of the Debtors.

24. The Debtors received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for each of the Transfers.

25. The Debtors were insolvent at the times that the Transfers were made or became insolvent as a result of each of the Transfers.

26. At the times of the Transfers, the Debtors were engaged in business or a transaction, or were about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the Debtors was unreasonably small capital.

27. At the times of the Transfers, the Debtors intended to incur, or believed that the Debtors would incur, debts that would be beyond the ability of the Debtors to pay as such debts matured.

28. The Transfers are avoidable pursuant to § 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and are recoverable by the Debtors from Defendant pursuant to § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

COUNT III
AVOIDANCE AND RECOVERY OF THE PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS
PURSUANT TO §§ 547(b) AND 550(a)(1) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

29. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 28 as if fully set forth in Count III herein.

30. The transfers made to Defendant by the Debtors within 90 days prior to the Petition Date (April 28, 2007 through July 27, 2007) total $109,015.00 (the “Preferential Transfers”).

31. In the event that Defendant was, at the time the Preferential Transfers were made, a creditor of one or more of the Debtors:

(a) The Preferential Transfers were made within 90 days of the Petition Date and were transfers of interests in property of the Debtors;

(b) The Preferential Transfers were made to or for the benefit of Defendant, a creditor of one or more of the Debtors;

(c) The Preferential Transfers were made for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by one or more of the Debtors to Defendant before the Preferential Transfers were made;

(d) The Preferential Transfers were made while the Debtors were insolvent within the meaning of § 547 and § 101(32) of the Bankruptcy Code;

(e) The Preferential Transfers enabled Defendant to receive more than he would have received if the bankruptcy cases of the Debtors were cases under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Preferential Transfers had not been made, and Defendant received payment of his debt to the extent provided by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code; and

(f) The Preferential Transfers constitute avoidable preferential transfers pursuant to the provisions of § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and are recoverable by the Debtors from Defendant pursuant to § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code.

REQUESTED RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Debtors pray that the Court will enter judgment in their favor as follows:

a. Pursuant to Counts I and II, avoiding the Transfers pursuant to §§ 548(a)(1)(A) or 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code and, pursuant to § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, against Defendant in the amount of the Transfers, but not less than $443,484.00, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the legal rate allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 from the date hereof;

b. Pursuant to Count III, avoiding the Preferential Transfers pursuant to § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and, pursuant to § 550(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, against Defendant in the amount of the Preferential Transfers, but not less than $109,015.00, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the legal rate allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 from the date hereof;

c. Providing for an award of costs to the Debtors; and

d. Providing for such other and further relief as this Court may deem necessary and proper.

Respectfully submitted, this 11th day of September, 2007.

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP
/s/ James R. Sacca
James R. Sacca
Georgia Bar No. 621843
John D. Elrod
Georgia Bar No. 246604
3290 Northside Parkway, N.W.
Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30327
(678) 553-2100
Counsel for Debtors

EXHIBIT A
(FREDERICK DAMRON)

Recipient Date of Transfer Method of Transfer Amount of Transfer

Frederick Damron September 2, 2006 E-Gold Withdrawal $250.00
Frederick Damron October 1, 2006 Check Withdrawal $27,800.00
Frederick Damron January 7, 2007 Check Withdrawal $7,500.00
Frederick Damron January 8, 2007 Check Withdrawal $18,000.00
Frederick Damron January 20, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $20,000.00
Frederick Damron January 26, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $28,000.00
Frederick Damron February 19, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $25,000.00
Frederick Damron February 26, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $18,000.00
Frederick Damron March 12, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $10,000.00
Frederick Damron March 12, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $7,350.00
Frederick Damron March 21, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $37,000.00
Frederick Damron March 21, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $725.00
Frederick Damron March 28, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $35,000.00
Frederick Damron March 28, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $544.00
Frederick Damron April 1, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $41,800.00
Frederick Damron April 5, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $7,500.00
Frederick Damron April 11, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $18,000.00
Frederick Damron April 14, 2007 E-Gold Withdrawal $12,000.00
Frederick Damron April 20, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $20,000.00
Frederick Damron April 28, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $16,000.00
Frederick Damron April 30, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $17,500.00
Frederick Damron May 1, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $5,550.00
Frederick Damron May 5, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $10,250.00
Frederick Damron May 12, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $45,000.00
Frederick Damron May 28, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $1,850.00
Frederick Damron May 31, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $1,690.00
Frederick Damron June 4, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $3,225.00
Frederick Damron June 6, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $1,550.00
Frederick Damron June 10, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $3,250.00
Frederick Damron June 12, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $1,585.00
Frederick Damron June 14, 2007 ACH Withdrawal $1,565.00
TOTAL : $443,484.00
EXHIBIT A PAGE 1 OF 1

Tuesday, September 4, 2007

Have You Been Sent An Email Link to This Page?

If so, then you know, work with or are in business with someone on this page.

I consider convicted felon Fred Damron aka Frederick Cecil Damron, Frederick C. Damron as well as his girlfriend Ginger Hagerman aka Ginger Lee Rose Hagerman, Ginger L. Hagerman, Ginger Rose to be SCAM ARTISTS. They claim to be in control of a "BILLION DOLLAR TRUST" created and organized by Paul Hiram Chappell and Charles A. Spradlin that pays premiums on Irrevocable Life Insurance Trusts called FREEDOM 7, FREEDOM 8, LASTING LEGACY, LEGACY 7.

Fred Damron is a convicted felon. He was indicted on five counts of "Misuse of a Social Security Number" by a federal grand jury and pled guilty to one count in 2003. Frederick Cecil Damron criminal docket 02-CR-00006 Upon speaking to an ex-family member of Mr. Damron's, I was informed that these counts stem from the misuse of his eldest son's social security number. This ex-family member alleges that Mr. Darmon began using the number to avoid paying income taxes and child support. It was only discovered after the child was grown and was enlisting in the armed services.

He is currently under investigation with the Ashland, KY police department. If you have any questions as to whether this program or any program like it is legal, please contact Detective Rob Brunty (606) 327-2068 who is heading this investigation.


Billion Dollar Trust Manager, Fred Damron's home

Fred owned and resided in this home located at 1282 Highland Drive, Saint Albans, WV.


Ginger Lee Rose Hagerman (aka Ginger Hagerman, Ginger L. Hagerman, Ginger Rose) declared personal bankruptcy in 2002. The address of the billion dollar charity - 799 Hunt Street - is her home apartment #13. As of 2002, she had been living off of government disability payments for three years and accumulated $34,000 in outstanding credit card and retail charge card debt. There's some interesting documentation in the court records about her having to amend her social security number that she used on the initial filings.



Companies Associated with Fred Damron & Ginger Hagerman:

GUARDIANS FOR LIVING FOUNDATION, INC.
799 HUNT STREET
ASHLAND , KY 41101

President: GINGER L HAGERMAN
Secretary: HAZEL B DAMRON
Director : GINGER L. HAGERMAN
Director : CHARLES O LEWIS
Director: HAZEL B DAMRON


RIGHTS OF THE CHILD FOUNDATION
799 HUNT STREET
ASHLAND , KY 41101

President: GINGER L HAGERMAN
Secretary: HAZEL B DAMRON
Director : GINGER L. HAGERMAN
Director : CHARLES O LEWIS
Director: HAZEL B DAMRON


GENESIS ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.

799 HUNT STREET
ASHLAND , KY 41101

President: GINGER L HAGERMAN
Director : GINGER L. HAGERMAN
Director : CHARLES O LEWIS
Director: HAZEL B DAMRON


GENESIS ASSET MANAGEMENT GROUP LLC
799 HUNT STREET
ASHLAND , KY 41101

Manager: GINGER L HAGERMAN


THE PERFECT RIDE, INC.
799 HUNT STREET
ASHLAND , KY 41101

President: GINGER L HAGERMAN
Secretary: HAZEL B DAMRON
Treasurer: HAZEL B DAMRON
Director : GINGER L. HAGERMAN
Director : CHARLES O LEWIS
Director: HAZEL B DAMRON


Everyone should be aware of with whom they are dealing so that they are not taken advantage of like so many others were in the recent Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust scam in which these two were involved.

Accomplices in this scam were:

Bob Pearson & Jeanie Pearson d/b/a

My Benefits America

UniqueCo Distribution or UniqueCo Distributing

Dallas, Texas & Plano, Texas



Charles Spradlin / Charles A. Spradlin
Sonship Ministries
Westfield, Indiana

Kent Traynor
Plano, Texas



Edward Allen Young / Ed Young
Ed Young & Associates
Carmel, Indiana

Gregory E. Young / Greg Young
Bancmark Financial

More information on all these individuals located at BEWARE OF BOB PEARSON.

I suspect that these individuals are heavily involved in other scams. If you have any information, please email me at watchoutforbob at yahoo dot com.

Monday, September 3, 2007

FREEDOM 7 PROGRAM and FREE WILL BAPTIST



Sent: Thursday, September 06, 2007 11:14 AM
To: Hagan, Mike
Subject: Freedom 7

Mr. Hagan:

I received word today that the FREEDOM 7 program is alive and well. The Free Will Baptist organization is promoting it to their congregations nationwide for Fred Damron & Ginger Hagerman. They are especially active in Oklahoma. They still claim that Fidelity & Guaranty is one of the insurance companies issuing policies on their behalf. Is this true?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

No, this is not true. We have never endorsed this concept.

Thank you for the information.

-Mike
____________________________
Michael Hagan, CFE
Forensic Investigator
Old Mutual Financial Network
OM Financial LifetOM Financial Life of New York
Phone: 410.895.0015
FAX: 410.895.0295 Email: mike.hagan@omfn.com



The Freedom 7 program is currently being promoted by the National Free Will Baptist organization. Free Will Baptist leaders have been made aware of these people's past and the fact that they are under investigation, but they continue to allow their members to submit personal information to these individuals.

This program was to have established an Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust (ILIT) for people who they approved. Any policies that were issued to MBA members were canceled due to non-payment. Of course, this begs the question, "why were they gathering all this personal information if they weren't going to pay for the policies"? The State of Oklahoma has issued a CEASE & DESIST order for Guardians For Living, MBA and it's employees. You can get a copy of the order from:

Sherry Standerfer, Legal Assistant
Oklahoma Insurance Department
P. O. Box 53408
Oklahoma City, OK 73152-3408
(405) 521-2748


The life insurance companies who were involved (even though they didn't know it) have opened fraud investigations. It is my understanding that some of the companies have taken steps to drop some of the agents from writing business for their companies.


Guardians For Living/Bancmark Financial
FREEDOM 7 DOCUMENTS



Guardians For Living/My Benefits America
FREEDOM 7 DOCUMENTS

INDEPENDENT ENROLLER AGREEMENT

MY BENEFITS AMERICA INC. “RD” AGREEMENT


Dates and email addresses used to notify the National Free Will Baptist:

To: keith@nafwb.org
Date: 1/12/2007
Subject: FREEDOM 7, GUARDIANS FOR LIVING

To: keith@nafwb.org
Date: 2/10/2007
Subject: FREEDOM 7 - Fidelity & Guaranty INVESTIGATION

To: dari@nafwb.org, melody@nafwb.org, steve@nafwb.org, debbie@nafwb.org, roy@nafwb.org
Date: 2/27/2007
Subject: FREEDOM 7 PROGRAM

To: jpuckett3@cox.net
Date: 1/12/2007
Subject: FREEDOM 7, GUARDIANS FOR LIVING

To: jpuckett3@cox.net
Date: 2/10/2007
Subject: Fidelity & Guaranty Investigation

Fred Damron Trying to Get Out of Paying for His Son's College Education

Fred Damron Fights Son's College Tuition Costs, but is a Record Producer???

"John Darin Rowsey is working on a new project with one of Christian Music's newest artists,Angie Caserta. You'll be hearing more about her. She's pictured here to the far left with John and executive producers Fred Damron and Ginger Hagerman."


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

January 2007 Term

___________

No. 33185

___________

CAROLE E. DAMRON SHORTT,

Petitioner Below, Appellee

v.


FREDERICK CECIL DAMRON,

Respondent Below, Appellant

________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County

Hon. Tod J. Kaufman, Judge

Case No. 87-C-1254

AFFIRMED

________________________________________________________

Submitted: April 4, 2007

Filed: May 10, 2007


Mark A. Swartz, Esq. Charles R. Webb, Esq.
Swartz & Stump Charleston, West Virginia
Charleston, West Virginia Attorney for Appellant
Attorney for Appellee

JUSTICE STARCHER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT


1. “In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family court judge that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.”
Syllabus Point 1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995).


2. W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] was amended in 1994 (using language now codified at W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002]) to authorize courts to vacate the provisions of certain divorce orders entered under the authority of W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] that required a parent to pay for a child's post-majority college expenses without the agreement of the parent.


3. “This Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment.” Syllabus Point 2, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W.Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965).

Starcher, J.:

In this case, we clarify the relationship between two versions of a statute relating to court orders requiring a divorced parent to pay for the college expenses of a child who has reached the age of majority.

I.
Facts & Background

The appellant in the instant case is Frederick Cecil Damron; the appellee is Carole Eileen Shortt. Mr. Damron and Ms. Shortt were married in 1982. In 1987, Ms. Shortt filed for divorce in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. (See footnote 1) At the time of their divorce, the parties had two children: Stuart Frederick Damron, (See footnote 2) who was four years old, and Alexander Thomas Damron, who was one year old.


On May 14, 1987, the parties entered into a written property settlement agreement. The parties' settlement agreement included a provision that stated, inter alia:


Husband agrees to underwrite the expense of providing the minor child/children of the parties with a post-high school education and to pay all tuition, fees, books, costs, and expenses relative to said child/children attending an accredited college, university, vocational or trade school of said child/children's choice; provided said child/children are full time students; provided they maintain at least a 2.0 grade point average after their Freshman year; provided they graduate by the time they attain the age of twenty-four (24) years; and provided the cost of said education does not exceed the cost of said children attending West Virginia University.

The terms of the property settlement agreement were incorporated into the circuit court's August 3, 1987 final divorce order (which also formally divorced the parties). The order stated:


It is further ordered and adjudged that the Defendant underwrite the expense of providing the minor child/children of the parties with a post high-school education and to pay all tuition, fees, books, costs, and expenses relative to said child/children attending an accredited college, university, vocational or trade school of said child/children's choice, provided said child/children are full time students; provided they maintain at least a 2.0 grade point average after their Freshman year; provided they graduate by the time they attain the age of twenty- four (24) years; and provided the cost of said education does not exceed the cost of said children attending West Virginia University.

In the fall of 2004, the parties' youngest son Alexander enrolled in Clemson University, a private college located in South Carolina. (See footnote 3) The appellant refused to pay for any of Alexander's college expenses. On August 30, 2004, as Alexander was beginning his freshman year at Clemson, Ms. Shortt filed a petition, pro se, in the Family Court of Kanawha County, seeking to hold Mr. Damron in contempt of the circuit court's 1987 final divorce order and seeking reimbursement for a portion of Alexander's college expenses.


After a hearing on Ms. Shortt's petition, on October 24, 2005, the family court entered an order concluding that W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] (See footnote 4) (discussed further hereinafter) required the vacation of the provision in the 1987 final divorce order that required Mr. Damron to pay Alexander's college expenses. (See footnote 5)


However, the family court also concluded that the parties' written settlement agreement was independently enforceable, and that Mr. Damron was contractually required to pay Alexander's college expenses based on the settlement agreement.


In support of these conclusions, the family court stated:


In a separation agreement a party may contractually agree to undertake an obligation that the law would not otherwise impose upon him and be bound by that agreement. There was no evidence that Mr. Damron's agreement to pay college expenses was procured through fraud, duress or other unconscionable conduct. W.Va. Code §48-11-103(c) [2002] does not require that a separation agreement providing for payment of college expenses be vacated and, therefore, the separation agreement may be enforced against Mr. Damron. [Paragraph numbers omitted.]


On November 22, 2005, Mr. Damron appealed the family court's ruling to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. On December 14, 2005, the circuit court entered an order affirming the family court's order. Mr. Damron now appeals from the circuit court's order.

II.
Standard of Review

In reviewing challenges to findings made by a family court judge that also were adopted by a circuit court, a three-pronged standard of review is applied. Under these circumstances, a final equitable distribution order is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law and statutory interpretations are subject to a de novo review.

Syllabus Point 1, Burnside v. Burnside, 194 W.Va. 263, 460 S.E.2d 264 (1995).

III.
Discussion


As previously noted, the circuit court relied upon language in W.Va. Code, 48- 11-103(c) [2002] (formerly codified at W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1994] and quoted hereinafter) to vacate the college expense payment provision of the parties' divorce order.


The briefs of both parties in the instant case assume that the circuit court's statute-based vacation of this portion of the divorce order was correct, and focus their discussion on the issue of the enforceability of the parties' separation agreement.

However, this Court has concluded, for the following-discussed reasons, that the circuit court erred in relying on W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] to vacate the college expense payment provisions of the parties' 1987 divorce order.


To properly understand the order “vacation” provisions of W.Va. Code, 48-11- 103(c) [2002], it is necessary to first understand West Virginia law in this area prior to 1993. While this Court's research has not disclosed anything in West Virginia's pre-1993 statutory law that specifically authorized a court to require the payment of a child's post-majority college expenses, our case law did clearly recognize that divorce orders that required a divorced parent to pay post-majority support for a child were enforceable _ if the order reflected a voluntary agreement by the parent to pay such support.

As this Court stated in Martin v. Martin, 175 W.Va. 542, 549, 346 S.E.2d 346 S.E.2d 61, 62 (1985) (per curiam):


There is nothing in the law, however, which precludes a parent from contracting to support his or her children after they reach the age of legal capacity. See In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W.Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978); Dimitroff v. Dimitroff, 159 W.Va. 57, 281 S.E.2d 743 (1975).

In 1993, W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] was enacted, and stated in pertinent part:

(b) The court may make an award for educational and related expenses for an adult child up the age of twenty-three who has been accepted or is enrolled and making satisfactory progress in an educational program at a certified or accredited college. The amount of these payments shall be related to the ability of the parent to make the payments. The payments shall be made to
the custodial parent when the adult child is residing with that parent or to a third party as designated by the court. If the child is not residing with a parent, the payments shall be paid to the child or to such third parties as so designated by the court.

This new statutory section specifically allowed courts to require a divorced parent to pay the college expenses of a child who was past the age of the child's majority _ without the agreement of the parent.


However, in 1994, only a year later, W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] was amended _ adding the order “vacation” language that is now codified at W.Va. Code, 48-11- 103(c) [2002]. The pertinent statutory language states:

The reenactment of this section during the regular session of the Legislature in the year one thousand nine hundred ninety- four shall not, by operation of the law, have any effect upon or vacate any order or portion thereof entered under the prior enactment of this section which awarded educational and related expenses for an adult child accepted or enrolled and making satisfactory progress in an educational program at a certified or accredited college. Any such order or portion thereof shall continue in full force and effect until the court, upon motion of a party, modifies or vacates the order upon finding that:

(1) The facts and circumstances which supported the entry of the original order have changed, in which case the order may be modified;

(2) The facts and circumstances which supported the entry of the original order no longer exist because the child has not been accepted or is not enrolled in and making satisfactory progress in an educational program at a certified or accredited college, or the parent ordered to pay such educational and related expenses is no longer able to make such payments, in which case the order shall be vacated;


(3) The child, at the time the order was entered, was under the age of sixteen years, in which case the order shall be vacated;

(4) The amount ordered to be paid was determined by an application of child support guidelines in accordance with the provisions of section eight, article two, chapter forty-eight-a of this code or legislative rules promulgated thereunder, in which case the order may be modified or vacated; or

(5) The order was entered after the fourteenth day of March, one thousand nine hundred ninety-four, in which case the order shall be vacated.

W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] (emphasis added).

The foregoing-quoted language, currently codified at W.Va. Code, 48-11- 103(c) [2002] and first enacted at W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1994], authorizes the vacation of only certain college expense payment orders that were entered under the prior enactment of this section.” The words “the prior enactment of this section” clearly refer to the 1993 enactment of section 15d, chapter 48, article 2.


Thus, W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] was amended in 1994 (using language now codified at W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002]) to authorize courts to vacate the provisions of certain divorce orders entered under the authority of W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1993] that required a parent to pay for a child's post-majority college expenses without the agreement of the parent.

In the instant case, the family court and circuit court concluded that W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] required the vacation of the college expense payment provisions of the parties' 1987 divorce order. (See footnote 6) However, that order was not entered under the authority of the 1993 enactment of W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1994]. Rather, the parties' divorce order was entered six years before section 15d even existed. Moreover, the parties' 1987 divorce order reflected the voluntary assumption by Mr. Damron of the duty to pay his son's college expenses. Therefore, W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] does not apply to the parties' divorce order, and the family court and circuit court erred in relying on this statute to vacate the college expense provision of the divorce order.


Having determined that the provision in the parties' 1987 divorce order requiring Mr. Damron to pay a portion of Alexander's college expenses was not subject to vacation under W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002], it is not necessary to reach the issue of the separate and independent enforceability of the parties' written separation agreement.


Additionally, we find that the record before this Court does not disclose any other grounds upon which the parties' divorce order is void or unenforceable. This Court has consistently held that:


This Court may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis for its judgment.

Syllabus Point 2, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W.Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965).

This well-established principle applies in the instant case. We therefore affirm the circuit court's ruling that Mr. Damron has an obligation to pay for Alexander's college expenses as provided in the parties' divorce order, on the grounds that he was required to do so by a valid court order.

IV.
Conclusion

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.


Footnote: 1

A copy of the original complaint was not included in the record.


Footnote: 2

There are no issues involving Stuart in the instant case.


Footnote: 3

The cost of attending Clemson University in July 2004 was $20,550.00. The cost of attending West Virginia University at the same time was $13,186.00. While the cost of attending Clemson University exceeds the limit mentioned in the property settlement agreement and the divorce decree, the appellee sought only to be reimbursed for the cost of a student attending West Virginia University.


Footnote: 4

The pertinent provisions of W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c) [2002] were originally codified at W.Va. Code, 48-2-15d [1994].


Footnote: 5

The family court's order stated that the court had “no choice but to vacate the provision of the final order requiring [Mr. Damron] to pay college expenses[,]” upon Mr. Damron's motion for such vacation.


Footnote: 6

The court relied on the grounds that Alexander was under sixteen when the order was entered, W.Va. Code, 48-11-103(c)(3) [2002].

Fred is Indicted on 2 Counts of First-Degree Wanton Endangerment

Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court Of Appeals

NO. 1999-CA-000674-MR

FREDERICK DAMRON APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT



v.
HONORABLE KELLEY ASBURY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00055



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: BUCKINGHAM, EMBERTON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.

SCHRODER,JUDGE: This is an appeal from a conviction of two counts of second-degree wanton endangerment. Because the trial court did not errin denying appellant's motion for a mistrial and motion for a new trial, we affirm.

On April 1, 1998, Deputy Sheriff Patrick Boggs was attempting to serve a civil summons on appellant, Frederick Damron. Deputy Boggs waited in a parking lot near appellant's workplace, and spotted a Toyota MR2 automobile which he believed belonged to appellant, and recognized appellant as the driver.

Deputy Boggs made eye contact with appellant, after which appellant sped off. Deputy Boggs followed appellant to the highway. A high speed chase ensued down I-64, during which a car and a tanker truck had to swerve to avoid the MR2. When the MR2 reached West Virginia,Deputy Boggs was ordered over the police radio to terminate the pursuit. At one point during the chase, Deputy Boggs was able to get the MR2's license plate number, which was registered to appellant.

A warrant was issued for appellant's arrest, and he turned himself in to the Boyd County sheriff's department on April 3, 1998. On June 11, 1998 appellant was indicted on two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment resulting from his causing the car and truck to swerve. A jury trial was held on March 10, 1999. Appellant's defense at trial was that he was not driving his MR2 that day, rather he was driving a green Oldsmobile that he borrowed from a friend. The jury received instructions on both first- and second-degree wanton endangerment. The jury deliberated for approximately two hours, and returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of second-degree wanton endangerment, recommending a sentence of 12 months in jail and a $500 fine. Defense counsel requested that the jury be polled.

The trial judge then asked each juror individually if this was their verdict. Each of the jurors responded yes, until the court asked juror Donald Dulan, who replied "No". The court asked juror Dulan again, and he again replied in the negative. The foreperson told the court "Your Honor, I understood we all voted in agreement."Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The court noted that the verdict must be unanimous, and sent the jury back to deliberate further. The jury returned after several minutes, with the same verdict. This time,when the jurors were polled, all of the jurors, including Dulan, responded "yes" when asked if that was their verdict. On March 17,1999, appellant filed a motion for new trial, on the grounds that the jury verdict was not unanimous. The trial court denied the motion on March 22, 1999, and this appeal followed:

On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant's motion for mistrial and motion for a new trial, because the jury verdict was not unanimous. When a jury verdict is announced, RCr 9.88 allows either party to require that the jury be polled, which is done by the clerk's or court's asking each juror if it is his verdict.

If,upon the poll, there is not unanimous concurrence, the verdict cannot be received. RCr 9.88. In Hart v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 768 S.W.2d 552z9(1989), a poll of the jury following their initial return of a guilty verdict revealed that one juror was ambiguous in her position. The defendant moved for a mistrial after this juror gave her ambiguous response. The court denied the motion and sent the jury back for further deliberations, after which the jury returned a second guilty verdict. The second poll of the jury revealed no lack of unanimity. This Court held that under KRS 29A.320(3)(e), the trial court was authorized to send the jury back for further deliberations after the initial jury poll revealed the juror's ambiguous opinion. Id.at 555. KRS 29A.320(3)(e) states that when the jury is polled, "If more than the number of jurors required by KRS 29A.280, as appropriate to the type of case being tried, answers in the negative, the jury must be sent out for further deliberation."

As the instant case was a criminal case, requiring a unanimous verdict,the trial court could not receive the verdict when juror Dulan responded "No". RCr 9.88; KRS 29A.280(3). Per KRS 29A.320(3)(e), when juror Dulan answered in the negative, it was appropriate for the trial court to send the jury back for further deliberation.

Appellant incorrectly cites Coomer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 238 S.W.2d 161 (1951) and Johnson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 709,215 S.W.2d 838 (1948), for the proposition that, unlike in Hart, in which a juror merely expressed misgivings, when a juror states a definite "No", that there must be a mistrial, because the jury verdict is not unanimous. Coomer and Johnson are readily distinguishable from Hart and the instant case. In Coomer, the trial court erred by accepting a guilty verdict, in spite of the fact that during the poll of the jury, one juror stated that he was forced to sign the verdict. In Johnson, the trial court erred when it received the verdict without conducting a poll of the jury, over defendant's objection.

In the instant case, the trial court did not receive the verdict after the poll revealed it was not at that point unanimous, but properly sent the jury back for further deliberations. KRS 29A.320(3)(e). When the jury returned the second time, the poll of the jury was unanimous, with the previously dissenting juror, Dulan, answering "Yes". To establish an absence of unanimity, upon being polled, the juror must connote that the verdict was given involuntarily, or was forced upon him, or against his will. Fleming v. Commonwealth, Ky., 419 S.W.2d 754 (1967). When juror Dulan replied "Yes" in the second poll, he did not indicate that the verdict was in any way involuntary or against his will.

Appellant further argues, that, at the very least, juror Dulan should have been examined to determine whether his
change in vote was influenced by coercion or threats. However, in Hart, this Court indicated that such an inquiry is not always necessary. In Hart, the second poll of the jury revealed no lack of unanimity, however, the defendant alleged that the trial court erred by not interviewing at length the juror who had misgivings after the first poll, to determine whether the second guilty verdict was, in fact, unanimous. Hart, 768 S.W.2d at 554-555.

This Court held that as none of the jurors had indicated any coercion, the trial court had no duty to interrogate the juror at length simply because she had previously expressed misgivings as to the initial guilty verdict. Id.at 555. Similarly, in the instant case, the trial judge had no duty to make such an inquiry of Dulan, as the second poll revealed no lack of unanimity, and neither Dulan nor any of the other jurors indicated any coercion.

Absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s decision whether or not to grant a mistrial will not be disturbed. Miller v. Commonwealth, Ky., 925 S.W.2d 449, 453 (1996). The granting of a new trial is a matter of judicial discretion, and unless there has been an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will not reverse. Jillson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 542, 545

Fred Damron & The Dollar Trust

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Charles William Adams Case Number: 1:04-MC-10193

Unrepresented Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF FACT

and MOTION FOR VOID JUDGMENT


NOW COMES THE PLAINTIFF, a Natural Man, the Sovereign Creator of his servant government, a creation of Our Creator, Sui Juris, who under threat, duress and coercion, petitioned and invoked the jurisdiction of this Court for the constrained purpose of this case 04-MC-10193 pursuant to his First Amendment right to redress and never knowingly or unknowingly waiving any his rights herein presents the following Verified Statement Of Fact and Motion For Void Judgment, concerning Judge Rya Zobel’s “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” of November 2, 2004 and presented to the Plaintiff and Defendant for the first time on January 11, 2005.

Notice To Judge Rya Zobel

The purpose of this notice is to establish the facts at issue in a controversy that has arisen between us due to the fact that you practiced law from the bench and issued a “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” inventing arguments in favor of the defendant which were never presented by the defendant (the government) without proper authority to do so and discarding any appearance of impartiality. Therefore the Plaintiff, having no due process in this court in which the defendant is represented by both the US Attorney and the judge may have no alternative but to take this controversy before another U.S. Court or a higher court. In order that each of us has the facts before us, I am, therefore, stating the verified facts that I am willing to swear to in court and which will be proven by the record. This is your opportunity to rebut the verified facts as I have enumerated them below. Any factual statement that you do not specifically rebut UNDER OATH will stand as undisputed verified fact in any future legal proceeding.

Please carefully review each numbered statement of fact, and if you disagree with such fact, state the reasons for your disagreement UNDER OATH, along with rebuttal. List each of your rebuttals, numbering them according to the number as listed below. If you do not specifically contest any fact listed below, I will be forced to conclude that you do not disagree with such fact.

VERIFIED STATEMENT OF FACTS

  1. A pro-se Plaintiff is to be held to a less stringent standard than professional attorneys. Judge Zobel, under her Oath of Office and Judicial Canons, is required to be fair to all litigants.

    “… allegations such as those asserted by petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers…” Haines v. Kerner, 404 US 519 (1972).

  1. Judge Rya Zobel denied even the illusion of impartiality and due process for the Plaintiff when she practiced law from the bench and created arguments for the defendant when she wrote and presented her “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” dated November 2, 2004.
  2. At no time did the defendant ever even bother to present any rebuttal at all to the Plaintiff’s arguments concerning the authority of the IRS agents to obtain search warrants or carry firearms on warrants other than subtitle E activities. When the defendant never even responded and therefore defaulted Judge Rya Zobel discarded her role as impartial judge weighing the facts of each side and with extreme prejudice invented arguments for the defendant and presented them in her “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” dated November 2, 2004.
  3. The court has shown blatant prejudice in favor of the defendant at all times during these proceeding including but not limited to sealing the plaintiff’s case so he could not obtain dockets or other information about his own case against the government. Without access to copies of the docket the plaintiff has no way to know when the government or the judge has entered and filings in this case. It is impossible for the plaintiff to obtain due process when his case against the government has been sealed.
  4. There is no order in the sealed docket to seal his case so there is obvious collusion between the US Attorney and either Judge Rya Zobel or her agents or underlings in the court to impede the plaintiff in the prosecution of this case.
  5. Judge Zobell acceded to fraud, perhaps unknowingly, perpetrated on the Court by the IRS agents and the U.S. Attorneys. It is possible that all parties to the fraud had no knowledge of this fraud; however, officials in this case now have full knowledge of this illegal activity and can be held accountable for any further unlawful activities and failures to take corrective measures. All willing participants of the perpetrated fraud also acceded to and perpetrated a deprivation of the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiff.
  6. The agents involved in these actions for the IRS are specifically excluded by title from obtaining warrants actions under subtitle A and subtitle C by 26 USC 7608. The defendant (the government) has never disputed this fact in this case.
  7. The agents involved in these actions for the IRS are specifically excluded by 26 USC 7608 from carrying firearms except when the warrants involve “Subtitle E” activities which are Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The defendant (the government) has never disputed this fact in this case.

    Judge Rya Zobel, you have indeed acted outside of your lawful authority by practicing law from the bench when you invented arguments for the defendant who never even bothered to respond to the facts specifically stated as #8 and #9 in this affidavit. Since the defendant has never bothered to respond they are in default and acquiesce to the fact that these claims are the undisputed truth. All officials may be held liable under U.S. Supreme Court rulings as follows.

    “Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law. Thus, ‘[o]n the merits, to establish personal liability in a 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.’ Id., at 166.” HAFER v. MELO, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).

    “When lawsuits are brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their "individual" capacity not their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity.” Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).

    “Personal involvement in deprivation of constitutional rights is prerequisite to award of damages, but defendant may be personally involved in constitutional deprivation by direct participation, failure to remedy wrongs after learning about it, creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occur or gross negligence in managing subordinates who cause violation.” (Gallegos v. Haggerty, N.D. of New York, 689 F. Supp. 93 (1988).

    “Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.” Miranda, 384 US 436, at 491.

    "No State legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his Undertaking to support it". Cooper Vs. Aaron. 358 U.S. 1 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).

    Judge Rya Zobel, perhaps unknowingly and unwillingly you have abandoned your role as impartial arbiter between the parties involved. Is it possible that you have been forced into this action by terrorist or extortion threats of the IRS or by your employer the defendant?

    “No sophisticated person is unaware that the Internal Revenue Service has been in possession of facts with respect to public officials which it has presented or shelved in order to serve what can only be called political ends, be they high or low. And a judge who knows the score is aware that every time his decisions offend the Internal Revenue Service, he is inviting a close inspection of his records.” Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167 (1965).

    Judge Zobel, I believe your “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” was based on erroneous assumptions and distorted conceptions of law and facts and that you used these preconceived notions to invent arguments for your employer, the defendant without relying on the following U.S. Supreme Court rulings:

    28 USC Sec. 455, and Marshall v Jerrico Inc., 446 US 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1980): "The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards the two central concerns of procedural due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262, 266-267 (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law."

    “Parties who, by the constitution and laws of the United States, have a right to have their controversies decided in their tribunals, have a right to demand the unbiased judgment of the court.” PEASE v. PECK, 59 U.S. 595 (1855).

    “It is true that no one has a vested right in any particular rule of the common law, but it is also true that the legislative power of a state can only be exerted in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and justice which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment is intended to preserve, and that a purely arbitrary or capricious exercise of that power whereby a wrongful and highly injurious invasion of property rights, as here, is practically sanctioned and the owner stripped of all real remedy, is wholly at variance with those principles.” TRUAX v. CORRIGAN, 257 U.S. 312, 330 (1921).

NOTICE TO Honorable Rya Zobel

If you fail to respond within 15 days the Plaintiff will be forced to conclude that you have been acting against the Plaintiff without authority of law. Plaintiff will, thereafter, commence a lawsuit against you. Your actions have caused the Plaintiff very much mental and emotional hardship, financial losses, along with expenses and losses suffered by your unauthorized actions.

Plaintiffs call your attention to the following rulings:

“When lawsuits are brought against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their "individual" capacity not their official capacity. When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of immunity.” Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr, 952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).

" ... where an act is done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction and this is known to the judge there is no immunity. Johnson v. MacCoy, 278 F2d 37 (9th Cir., 1960); Kenney V. Fox, 232 F 2d 288 ..." Rhodes v. Houston; 202 Fed Supp. 624


A ruling in violation of precedent rulings is the performance of an unconstitutional act by a judge: “Rule 28A(i) expands the judicial power beyond the limits set by article III by allowing us complete discretion to determine which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not. Insofar as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore unconstitutional.” Anastasoff v. United States of America 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).

The Court in Yates Vs. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that, "Not every action by any judge is in exercise of his judicial function. It is not a judicial function for a Judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the Courthouse, when a judge acts as a Trespasser of the Law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject matter jurisdiction and the Judge's orders are void, of no legal force or effect."

“An instrumentality of Government he might be and for the greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to be answerable for his acts.” BRADY v. ROOSEVELT STEAMSHIP CO., 317 U.S. 575 (1943).

"There is also a general rule that if any officer- ministerial or otherwise- acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law, he is liable in an action for damages for injuries suffered by a citizen as a result thereof." Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 137, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1938) See also Estrada v. Hills, 401 F.Supp. 429, 434 (N.D.Ill. 1975).

Plaintiff, hereby, await your response and/or rebuttals. If the Honorable Rya Zobel needs additional response time, please notify Plaintiff within the 15 day time period.

“Judgments entered where court lacked either subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or that were otherwise entered in violation of due process of law, must be set aside”. Jaffe and Asher v. Van Brunt, S.D.N.Y.1994. 158 F.R.D. 278.

“Void order which is one entered by court which lacks jurisdiction over parties or subject matter, or lacks inherent power to enter judgment, or order procured by fraud, can be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally, provided that party is properly before court”, People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 644 N.E.2d 66 (Ill.App. 2 Dist. 1994).

“A ‘void’ judgment, as we all know, grounds no rights, forms no defense to actions taken thereunder, and is vulnerable to any manner of collateral attack (thus here, by ). No statute of limitations or repose runs on its holdings, the matters thought to be settled thereby are not res judicata, and years later, when the memories may have grown dim and rights long been regarded as vested, any disgruntled litigant may reopen the old wound and once more probe its depths. And it is then as though trial and adjudication had never been.” 10/13/58 FRITTS v. KRUGH. SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN, 92 N.W.2d 604, 354 Mich. 97.

“Decision is void on the face of the judgment roll when from four corners of that roll, it may be determined that at least one of three elements of jurisdiction was absent: (1) jurisdiction over parties, (2) jurisdiction over subject matter, or (3) jurisdictional power to pronounce particular judgment that was rendered”, B & C Investments, Inc. v. F & M Nat. Bank & Trust, 903 P.2d 339 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 1995).

Plaintiff Charles William Adams, A Natural Person, a Creator of Government and a Creation of Our Creator hereby files this Motion for Void Judgment with this Honorable Court based on the following:

    MOTION TO VACATE FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

    1. Judge Rya Zobel allegedly issued the “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” dated November 2, 2004. Since the document contained arguments for the defendant that the defendant never even presented the Pro-se Plaintiff needs to be assured that it was Judge Zobel and not someone else who wrote the “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION”. Defendants respectfully demand that Judge Zobel signs the proposed order of the earlier motion.

2. Since this chain of events was all started by the IRS, and the Plaintiff is aware of previous threats to judges by the IRS, and therefore, in order to obtain justice against intimidation or threats, the Plaintiff respectfully demands that Judge Zobel provide a sworn statement that there have been no communications with the IRS or threats by the IRS or any government agents or by her employer or anyone working for the US Attorney(s).

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully demands that Judge Zobel provide a copy of her Oath of Office, in order to establish personal jurisdiction for issuance of the order.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully demands that Judge Zobel sign a statement under Oath that there have been no communications between Judge Zobel and any official of the IRS or other governmental official, without the Plaintiffs being informed.

Wherefore, Defendants respectfully demand that Judge Zobel sign a statement under Oath that there have been no threats made to her by the IRS or any other government agent, real or implied.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully demand that Judge Zobel issue an Order to vacate the “REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION” dated November 2, 2004.

Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully demand that Judge Zobel issue an order to immediately pronounce the search warrants 04M-1053-JGD and 04M-1055-JGD void ab initio and the property taken from 221 Madison Street during the raid per those warrants to be immediately returned to the Plaintiff at 42 Monroe Street, Norwood Massachusetts and all evidence obtained to be quashed ab initio and the Plaintiff to be made whole by the return of all property, licenses and his good name and standing.

Submitted by:

_____________________________ _________________________________

Clyde W. Goodguy Rea B. Goodguy

Dated: ____________________

Notary: The above signed have presented themselves before me and have properly identified themselves.


Here is Clyde's information:

Clyde W. Goodguy, individually and in his capacity as the trustee of "THE DOLLAR TRUST, et al.

REA B. Goodguy (Wife)

Clyde W. Goodguy, Corporation Sole

Box 227
Freedom, WY 83120
Phone: 208-873-2760

Email: cwGoodguy@silverstar.com

Sincerely,

Frederick C. Damron
130 South Cold Springs Road
Olive Hill, KY 41164
Phone: 606-286-4096
Fax: 606-286-0286
Email: fdamron@ezwv.com